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EXTENDED ABSTRACT  
This paper examines the relationship between the 
antitrust environment and technological 
inventiveness in the US economy, where 
technological inventiveness is measured by patent 
activity. Although not all registered patents are 
commercialised into inventions, patent data 
provide a valuable source of information about 
technological efforts. Patenting is also very 
important as it is linked to an economic and legal 
environment which actively encourages and 
protects competition. 
The US economy has been providing legal 
protection to inventors for more than 200 years 
now, and in the last 100 years or more it has also 
been a relatively highly regulated antitrust 
environment. The hypothesis tested in the study is 
whether antitrust enforcement activity, as 
measured by the number of civil filings of the US 
Department of Justice, has had a significant 
impact on the level of technological inventiveness 
in the US economy, after adjusting for other 
factors that have an impact on innovation, such as 
research and development expenditures and real 
economic growth. Impacts of civil antitrust case 
filings, criminal antitrust case filings and total US 
Department of Justice antitrust case filings on 
patent activity in the USA (based on data from the 
US Patent and Trademark Office) are estimated 
for the period 1953-2000.  
During the above period, patent activity and R&D 
expenditure have exhibited increasing trends; 
while the growth rate in real GDP has not 
exhibited noticeable trending behaviour and 
unemployment rate peaked in the mid-1980s and 
subsequently declined in the 1990s. Criminal 
antitrust filings comprise 60% of total antitrust 
filings and they have not exhibited any discernible 
trends during the 1953-2000 period; while civil 
antitrust filings peaked in the early 1960s and 
early 1970s, then declined dramatically in the 1980s 
followed by a slight rise in the 1990s and gradual 
decline towards the end of the period. 
Against this background, the estimated econometric 
models assume that technological inventiveness 
(for which the proxy is patent activity) is a function 
of past patent activity, US aggregate R&D 
expenditures, the rate of growth in real GDP, the 
overall US unemployment rate and includes 
antitrust enforcement variables (civil, criminal and 
total antitrust filings). The estimation is undertaken 
by weighted least squares and the Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
method is used to adjust for possible 
heteroskedasticity and/or serial correlation. All the 
models are estimated using the EViews 4.0 
econometric software package. 
A simple dynamic model that provided an adequate 
fit to the data is given as follows:    
Patent Successt  = 20736 + 0.48 Patent Successt-1 + 
0.24 US R&Dt + 643 Real GDP Growtht – 1991 US 
Unemployment Ratet + 308 Civil Antitrust Cases 
Filedt-1  
The empirical results show that civil case filings 
have a statistically significant impact on 
technological inventiveness.  
Residual claimants of firms clearly understand the 
competitive landscape of the US economy in which 
they operate – when the US Department of Justice 
emits a signal to the market of robust enforcement 
intent, firms react by increasing their technological 
inventiveness. It might also be expected that civil 
antitrust filings would have a stronger impact than 
criminal antitrust activity on innovative activity as 
the civil cases involve firms that play according to 
legal rules. 
 
 
9071.  INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to examine the 
relationship between the antitrust environment and 
technological inventiveness in the US economy, 
where inventiveness is represented by patent 
activity. Patents by their nature are inventions
1 and 
studies indicate that only between 30 and 54% of 
all patented technologies complete the 
commercialisation process to become innovations 
(see for example Mattes et al., 2005). According to 
Rosenbloom (2000, p.1185), “patents provide data 
on technological effort, which is only one aspect of 
innovative activity”; nevertheless, this particular 
aspect of innovation is above all relevant when it 
comes to an economic and legal environment that 
actively encourages and protects competition. 
Hence, in this study we use patents as a proxy for 
technological inventiveness that feeds innovation 
following a linear technology-push interpretation 
of the innovation process (Meyer, 2002).
2 
Patent data have been widely used to describe 
innovation since the mid 1970s. More recently, 
Gallini (2002) explored the role of patents and 
patent portfolios in the competitive landscape. 
Marinova (1999, 2001) examined models of 
patents in the context of patents as an indicator of 
national technological strengths and capabilities. 
McAleer et al., (2002) analysed the time series 
properties of patent activity for the leading 
inventive countries by modelling the volatility 
inherent in monthly US patent shares. They have 
also studied various technological clusters, such as 
anti-pollution and environmental technologies 
(Chan et al., 2004, 2005), electronics and transport 
industries (Marinova and McAleer, 2002). 
The hypothesis to be tested here is whether 
antitrust enforcement activity, as measured by the 
number of civil filings of the US Department of 
Justice, has had a significant impact on the level of 
technological inventiveness in the US economy, as 
presented by patent activities, after adjusting for 
other factors that have an impact on innovation, 
                                                           
1 Recently the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) (2003) has used “invention” 
and “patent” interchangeably in the sense that a 
patent is a granted exclusive right for the use of an 
invention, which is a novel product or process, or a 
novel technical solution to an existing problem.   
Industrial designs, which are the aesthetic, artistic 
or ornamental aspects of articles, are not 
considered to represent patents. 
2 For definition of technological innovation, please 
refer to the Oslo Manual (OECD, 1996). 
such as research and development expenditures 
(R&D) and real economic growth.   
The United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) has been collecting data on patent 
applications and patents granted (equivalently, 
successful patent applications) for an extended 
period, with some of the series dating back to 
1790. The USPTO decomposes patent activity into 
domestic and foreign, as well as utility, design and 
plant patents. As such disaggregated patent data 
are available, we will examine some of these 
categories separately in the empirical analysis. 
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as 
follows. Section 2 discusses the US antitrust 
environment and patent activity over time. Section 
3 presents the data, discusses trends in antitrust 
enforcement, patent activity and economic growth 
in the USA over the past 50 years, and presents the 
model to be estimated. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results. The impact of civil antitrust case 
filings, criminal antitrust case filings and total US 
Department of Justice antitrust case filings on 
patent activity in the USA are estimated for the 
period 1953-2000. Some concluding remarks are 
given in Section 5. 
2.  PATENT ACTIVITY AND ANTITRUST 
ENVIRONMENT 
The US economy, with its large size and 
technologically advanced nature, offers the most 
potent example of the power of patent legislation 
which goes back as far as to the 1790s. There is 
considerable statistical evidence in support of the 
relationship between economic growth, R&D and 
patent activity (Freeman, 1992; Idris, 2003; Nelson 
and Winter, 1982).  More recently, there has been 
significant growth in patent applications 
concomitant with the growth in knowledge 
activities in areas such as advanced materials, 
information technology, bioinformatics and 
nanotechnology. These activities have also 
contributed substantially to the level and rate of 
growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) of 
various countries and to creating new employment 
opportunities. 
For more than 100 years the US economy has been 
a relatively highly regulated antitrust environment. 
The full force of competition laws regarding 
intellectual property has been enforced in relation 
to, for example, market segmentation (Hanks, 
2003), market power (Pleatsikas and Teece, 2001), 
and even patent information dissemination 
(Ebersole, 2003). There are clear benefits from 
antitrust laws in the constant pursuit of new 
inventions and the early adoption of technological 
908innovations. An example of the profound impact 
of the US antitrust environment is the existence of 
the Internet (Mowery and Simcoe, 2002) or the 
capitalisation of research in the areas of 
monoclonal antibodies and other biotechnologies 
(Capitalising..., 1999).  
On the other hand, strategic alliances, research 
partnerships and joint ventures have also been used 
to reduce the exposure to antitrust regulations in 
order to increase the propensity of firms to engage 
in costly high-tech R&D activities (Link et al., 
2002; Teece, 1992). Hart (2001) argues that the 
history of antitrust policy in the USA exhibits 
major swings every few decades between 
favouring concentration and de-concentration.   
Such swings have had significant impacts on 
technological innovation, including the generation 
of new inventions and patents. This argument has 
been extended by Baumol (2001), for example, 
who argues that antitrust regulatory agencies and 
the courts should exercise extreme restraint in 
interfering with inter-firm coordination and joint 
decision making in relation to innovation. 
In this conflicting background, this paper examines 
the relationship between the antitrust environment 
and technological inventiveness in the US 
economy, specifically whether US antitrust 
enforcement activity (as measured by criminal and 
civil filings) has had a significant impact on the 
level of inventiveness in the US economy, as 
measured by patent activity
3.  
The impact of civil antitrust case filings, criminal 
antitrust case filings and total US Department of 
Justice antitrust case filings on patent activity in 
the USA are estimated for the period 1953-2000. 
3.  DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
3.1.  Data 
The measures of technological inventiveness 
examined in this paper are total patent applications 
and patents granted (that is, successful patent 
application) to domestic companies (cf. www. 
gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm). On 
average, 59.5% of total patent applications were 
successful during the 1953-2000 period.  
                                                           
3 According to Tyson (2001) and Hufker and 
Alpert (1995), the US patent and antitrust 
environment encourages the flow of technological 
information through cross-licensing. This paper 
however does not trace the use of patents. 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust 
Division tracks case filings in US District Courts 
in its Workload Statistics for both civil and 
criminal cases. We use the numbers of civil 
antitrust case filings, criminal antitrust case filings 
and total DOJ antitrust case filings as potential 
antitrust enforcement variables. The average shares 
of civil and criminal antitrust filings are 40% and 
60% respectively.  
The growth rate in real US GDP and the US 
unemployment rate are also examined as potential 
variables in the various empirical models. Data for 
GDP, consumer price index (CPI) and the 
unemployment rate were obtained from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA), US Department of 
Commerce, for the period 1953-2001.  
In the empirical models also use data from the 
National Science Foundation relating to total US 
R&D expenditures, which are given in $millions 
(cf. National Science Foundation, Division of 
Science Resources Studies (NSF/SRS), National 
Patterns of R&D Resources: 2000 Data Update, 
NSF 01-309, Arlington, VA, March 2001, 
available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs.nsf01309/start.htm).  
Summary statistics of all data sets can be found in 
Marinova et al. (2005). 
3.2.  Model 
The model to be estimated assumes that 
technological inventiveness (for which the proxy is 
patent activity) is a function of past patent activity, 
US aggregate R&D expenditures, the rate of 
growth in real GDP, and the overall US 
unemployment rate.  
Graphs of the time series behaviour of the three 
antitrust variables for the years 1953-2000 are 
given in Figures 1a-1c. As criminal antitrust filings 
comprise 60% of total antitrust filings, it is not 
surprising that the two figures display similar 
patterns over time. It is interesting to note the 
increase in the average numbers of filings in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
The graph for civil antitrust filings indicates that 
antitrust enforcement peaked in the early 1960s 
and early 1970s, and then declined dramatically in 
the Reagan years in the 1980s. The Clinton years 
led to a slight rise in enforcement activity, with a 
gradual decline as the Bush policies started to 
prevail.   
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Figures 2a and 2b present the same graphical 
information for the two patent activity (or 
technological inventiveness) variables. They both 
have exhibited increasing trends over time. During 
1953-2000, the real GDP growth rate has not 
exhibited trending behaviour that is discernible. 
The R&D expenditure has had a positive and 
significant trend over the entire sample period, 
while the unemployment rate peaked in the mid-
1980s, and subsequently declined throughout the 
1990s. These variables were found to be stationary 
processes. 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section we estimate (using EViews 4.0) the 
econometric models of technological inventiveness 
(namely, the two patent activity variables) as a 
function of lagged inventiveness, the level of US 
R&D expenditure, the rate of growth in real GDP, 
the US unemployment rate, and the antitrust 
enforcement variables.   
910As is standard practice, due to the potential 
departures from the standard assumptions, 
estimation of each of the models is undertaken by 
weighted least squares. The Newey-West (1987) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
(HAC) method is used to adjust for possible 
heteroskedasticity and/or serial correlation in order 
to yield robust and consistent estimates of the 
covariance matrix.   
Equation (1) below was also estimated using a 
variety of count data models, which is discussed 
briefly in footnote 4. A simple dynamic model that 
provided an adequate fit to the stationary data is 
given as follows:   
(1) Patent Successt  = 20736 + 0.48 Patent 
Successt-1 + 0.24 US R&Dt + 643 Real GDP 
Growtht – 1991 US Unemployment Ratet + 308 
Civil Antitrust Cases Filedt-1  
As can be seen in Table 1 below, we specified a 
range of models which included technological 
inventiveness activity, which can be measured as 
the number of total patent applications and the 
number of successful patent filings. These two 
models were then estimated with various 
specifications of the antitrust environment, 
including the total number of DOJ filings, and the 
numbers of civil case filings and criminal case 
filings.   
 
 
Table 1: HAC Estimates of Innovation Variables with Antitrust Enforcement 
 
Exogeneous 
Variable 
Total Patent 
Applications 
Successful Patent 
Applications 
Logarithm of Total 
Patent Applications 
Logarithm of 
Successful Patent 
Applications 
Intercept 21138
*  20736
*  0.31 4.4
* 
Y(t-1) 0.76
*  0.48
* 0.96
* 0.39 
US R&D  0.24
*  0.24
* 0.028
* 0.24
* 
Real GDP Growth 
Rate 
585
* 643
* 0.002 0.017
* 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-2425
*  -1991
* -0.084
** -0.32
* 
Civil Antitrust 
Filings (t-1)  
143
*  308
*  -0.021
*  0.079
* 
Adjusted R
2   0.98  0.94  0.98  0.92 
Note:   Y(t-1) indicates the lagged dependent variable, * indicates statistical significance at the 5%  
level, and ** indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.            
 
 
We also specified dynamic structures for the 
impact of the antitrust environment according to 
various lags. As indicated in Table 1, the results 
given in the simple dynamic model in equation 
(1) provide an adequate fit to the data. The best 
empirical model suggests that civil cases filed by 
the Department of Justice in Federal District 
Courts, lagged one period, have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on technological 
inventiveness, as do R&D expenditure and the 
rate of growth in US real GDP
.4 . 
                                                           
4 Interestingly, when we attempted to 
accommodate the “count” nature of the patent 
data by estimating poisson, negative binomial or 
exponential models by the maximum likelihood 
method, the civil filings antitrust variable 
continued to be robust in that it always had a 
positive and statistically significant impact on 
innovation.  
911When equation (1) was specified with criminal 
antitrust filings and total DOJ cases filed as 
explanatory variables, both were found to be 
weak exogenous controls for the variation in 
technological inventiveness. However, civil 
filings were robust in that they appeared to have a 
statistically significant impact in explaining 
variations in the patent activity variables, 
regardless of which patent variable was specified.  
There are several possible factors leading to the 
apparent significant impact of civil antitrust case 
filings on technological inventiveness and 
consequently innovation. One explanation is that 
the prosecution of firms alleged to have broken 
antitrust laws may be construed as an important 
signal to the market. Such prosecutions send a 
deterrent signal to all agents that these 
unsatisfactory practices are not tolerated, which 
encourages them to seek legitimate ways of 
imposing their presence in competitive markets.  
Growth in technological inventiveness activity 
through increased intellectual property is an 
indication of lawful behaviour, and has twin 
impacts on dealing with competition. First, it 
encourages capital formation and taking 
advantage of novelty and creativity. Second, it 
opens the route for cross-licensing of the patented 
technologies, and hence avoiding the penalties 
inherent in antitrust laws through legal means.  
On the basis of these empirical results, civil 
antitrust filings are also seen as a mechanism for 
reinforcing the trustworthiness and power of the 
legal system, including the protection of 
intellectual property. The most significant finding 
from the analysis of the empirical data is that civil 
antitrust filings, which represent social values 
within American society, strongly encourage 
technological inventiveness and innovative 
behaviour that is the engine of economic 
improvement. The role of civil antitrust filings is 
more significant than either the number of 
criminal antitrust filings or the total number of 
antitrust filings by the Department of Justice. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper analysed the relationship between 
technological inventiveness (as measured by US 
patent activity) and the antitrust environment (as 
measured by the numbers of civil antitrust case 
filings, criminal antitrust case filings, and total 
US Department of Justice antitrust case filings). It 
was found that, after adjusting for other broad 
macroeconomic factors such as research and 
development expenditures and real economic 
growth, civil antitrust filings by the DOJ have a 
statistically significant impact on the level of 
innovative activity.   
Residual claimants of firms clearly understand the 
competitive landscape in which they operate such 
that, when the DOJ emits a signal to the market of 
robust enforcement intent, firms react by 
increasing their inventiveness. It might be 
expected that civil antitrust filings would have a 
stronger impact than criminal antitrust activity on 
innovative activity as the civil cases involve firms 
that play according to legal rules.  
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